




Exercise peering definitions 



The  
Peering Simulation  
Game



©2013 DrPeering International  
Licensed material – [sales@DrPeering.net](mailto:sales@DrPeering.net)  
<http://DrPeering.net>

# Meet the Presenter

---




William B. Norton

- Started working on Internet (NSFNET) in 1988
- 1st “Chairman” of North American Network Operator Group (NANOG) (1994-1998)
- 1998-2008 Co-Founder & Chief Technical Liaison, Equinix Inc. (NSDQ: EQIX)
- 2008-Present - DrPeering, Executive Director
  - Two-day On-Site Peering Workshops (EU/Africa)
- 2013 International Internet Exchange (IIX) CSO

# White Paper Process

- Peering=under-documented Internet Operations Topic
- Interconnection Strategies for ISPs
  - “When does peering make sense?”
  - Lunches, document answers, create model, review, stepwise refinement
- Result: White Paper that reflects the community mindset
- 12 white papers --> Book



on Amazon.com  
DropBox  
iTunes

Freely available on  
<http://DrPeering.net>

# Agenda

---


1. Introduce Internet Transit
2. Introduce Internet Peering
3. Peering Simulation Game

# 1) Internet Transit:

Connecting to the Edge of the Internet

# Internet Transit Service

- Announce Reachability
- Metered Service
- Simple
- “Internet → This Way”






# Internet Transit Pricing Model

- Typically metered
  - Priced In \$/Mbps (Mega-bit-per-second)
- Volume (Mbps) measured at 95<sup>th</sup> percentile
- Definition: The 95th Percentile Measurement Method (also called 95/5) uses a single measurement (the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile 5 minute sample for the month) to determine the transit service volume for monthly transit fee calculation.

# 95<sup>th</sup> Percentile Billing Calculation


- 5 minute samples
- Month of deltas
- 95<sup>th</sup> percentile
- Max(in,out)
- Origin of 95<sup>th</sup>?





# Internet Price Declines (U.S.)

- “Can’t
- “No c
- Pricin
- Trend



# 7 Observations About Internet Transit

---


1. Simple Service
2. Metered Service
3. Transit Commits and Discounts
4. Contract Terms
5. Is a Commodity
6. Customer-Supplier Relationship
7. May have SLAs (joke)

## 2) Internet Peering:

Connecting to the Core of the Internet


# What is Internet Peering?

- Definition: Internet Peering is the business relationship whereby two companies reciprocally provide access to each others' customers.



# Internet Peering

- 3 Key Points
  1. Peering is not a transitive relationship
  2. Peering is not a perfect substitute
  3. Peering is typically settlement free



## 3) Peering Simulation Game

Exercise the Peering Definitions



# Apply the definitions

---

- Strategy Game
- Use the terminology correctly
- Negotiate Peering
- Successful in dozens of fora
- Engaging
- Fun!

# The Game Board

ISPs (A,B,C,D)

IXPs (E,W,N,S)


Squares=Traffic

Traffic=Revenue

(\$2000/square/month)

Pay Transit Fees

(\$1000/others' squares/month)



# The Scorecard

ROUND	PLAYER	Roll	# Squares Owned	Revenue (Squares * \$2,000)	#OthersSquares	Transit Cost (*\$1000)	Peering Costs	Net	Running Total	XpeerY	PLAYER	Pay for Transit to A?	Pay for Transit to B?	Pay for Transit to C?	Pay for Transit to D?
-------	--------	------	-----------------	-----------------------------	----------------	------------------------	---------------	-----	---------------	--------	--------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

Notes:	Jan A	Jan B	Jan C	Jan D	Feb A	Feb B	Feb C	Feb D	Mar A	Mar B	Mar C	Mar D	A	B	C	D
Can only move adjacently and diagonally	## 1	## 1	## 1	## 1	## 1	## 1	## 1	## 1	## 1	## 1	## 1	## 1	1	1	1	1
Hint: Calculate cost of NOT peering vs. Cost of peering	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$2,000	1	1	1	1
At end of game we assume all roll a 3 for remaining rolls	3 (\$3,000)	3 (\$3,000)	3 (\$3,000)	3 (\$3,000)	3 (\$3,000)	3 (\$3,000)	3 (\$3,000)	3 (\$3,000)	3 (\$3,000)	3 (\$3,000)	3 (\$3,000)	3 (\$3,000)	1	1	1	1
Winner is the ISP will the largest bank account at the end	\$0 (\$1,000) \$23,000	\$0 (\$1,000) \$23,000	\$0 (\$1,000) \$23,000	\$0 (\$1,000) \$23,000	\$0 (\$1,000) \$22,000	\$0 (\$1,000) \$22,000	\$0 (\$1,000) \$22,000	\$0 (\$1,000) \$22,000	\$0 (\$1,000) \$21,000	\$0 (\$1,000) \$21,000	\$0 (\$1,000) \$21,000	\$0 (\$1,000) \$21,000	1	1	1	1

# 3 Rules

1. Goal: **Maximize bank holdings**. Make money by acquiring customers and reduce transit costs by peering
2. Play: Roll the dice and expand your network by selecting that many adjacent “squares” of customers

Gain transit revenue of \$2000 for each customer square you own


Pay transit fees of \$1000 for each square of traffic that **other** ISPs own

3. If at Exchange Point, two ISPs can **negotiate peering**:

- \$2000 recurring cost and loss of 2 turns, ISPs negotiates who covers the costs of peering


Quick round...

# Transit Provider X



# Transit Provider Y


# Transit Provider X



# Transit Provider Y




# Transit Provider X



# Transit Provider Y

# Transit Provider X




# Transit Provider Y

# Scoreboard after Round 1

---

- ISP A: \$9,000
- ISP B: \$0
- ISPC: \$3,000
- ISPD: -\$13,000


# Transit Provider X



# Transit Provider Y

# Transit Provider X


A Position  
 9 Revenue squares  
 1 lost turn  
 Peering w/C  
 reduced cost \$8000/turn



B rolls 6,  
 Attaches to IXE\*IXN

Receives revenue on 10 squares (10\*\$2000)  
 Pays Transit on others squares (21\*\$1000)  
 $20,000 - 21,000 = -\$1,000$

Wants to peer with A – split costs?  
 NO: You pissed me off,  
 Yes: if \$0 & B lose both turns  
 Both walk away



# Transit Provider Y

Let's play!

---

## WELCOME TO **BILLAND**

4 ISPs that have never played before

Open Board

\$35,000 VC Funding

~~\$25,000 VC Funding~~ – HARD Economic Times

We want to hear your thought process and  
peering negotiations

Winner - prize





# Play Game

**Starting Point**

- Get \$2000 revenue for each square you own
- Pay \$1000 transit fee to your upstream for each square others own
- Internet Exchange Point East
- Reduce transit fee by peering with other ISPs at exchange point; \$2000 per round and loss of 2 turns, split how ISPs see it

**peering costs**

ROUND	PLAYER	Roll	Bonus Content Squares # Squares Owned	Revenue (Squares * \$2000)	#OthersSquares	Transit Cost (\$1000)	Peering Costs	Net	Running Total	XpeerY	PLAYER	Pay for Transit to A?	Pay for Transit to B?	Pay for Transit to C?	Pay for Transit to D?	Sum of Transit \$\$\$ paid to X	Sum of Transit \$\$\$ Paid to Y
0	A	##	0	\$0	3	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0		A	1	1	1	1	\$	
0	B	##	0	\$0	3	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0		B	1	1	1	1	\$	
0	C	##	0	\$0	3	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0		C	1	1	1	1	\$	
0	D	##	0	\$0	3	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0		D	1	1	1	1	\$	
0	A	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$24,000		A	1	1	1	1	\$	
0	B	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$24,000		B	1	1	1	1	\$	
0	C	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$24,000		C	1	1	1	1	\$	
0	D	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$24,000		D	1	1	1	1	\$	
1	A	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$23,000		A	1	1	1	1	\$	3,000
1	B	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$23,000		B	1	1	1	1	\$	6,000
1	C	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$23,000		C	1	1	1	1	\$	3,000
1	D	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$23,000		D	1	1	1	1	\$	6,000
2	A	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$22,000		A	1	1	1	1	\$	9,000
2	B	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$23,000		B	1	1	1	1	\$	12,000
2	C	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$23,000		C	1	1	1	1	\$	9,000
2	D	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$23,000		D	1	1	1	1	\$	12,000
3	A	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$22,000		A	1	1	1	1	\$	15,000
3	B	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$22,000		B	1	1	1	1	\$	18,000
3	C	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$22,000		C	1	1	1	1	\$	15,000
3	D	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$22,000		D	1	1	1	1	\$	18,000
4	A	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$21,000		A	1	1	1	1	\$	21,000
4	B	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$21,000		B	1	1	1	1	\$	24,000
4	C	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$21,000		C	1	1	1	1	\$	21,000
4	D	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$21,000		D	1	1	1	1	\$	24,000
5	A	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$20,000		A	1	1	1	1	\$	27,000
5	B	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$20,000		B	1	1	1	1	\$	30,000
5	C	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$20,000		C	1	1	1	1	\$	27,000
5	D	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$20,000		D	1	1	1	1	\$	30,000
6	A	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$19,000		A	1	1	1	1	\$	33,000
6	B	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$19,000		B	1	1	1	1	\$	36,000
6	C	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$19,000		C	1	1	1	1	\$	33,000
6	D	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$19,000		D	1	1	1	1	\$	36,000
7	A	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$18,000		A	1	1	1	1	\$	39,000
7	B	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$18,000		B	1	1	1	1	\$	42,000
7	C	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$18,000		C	1	1	1	1	\$	39,000
7	D	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$18,000		D	1	1	1	1	\$	42,000
8	A	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$17,000		A	1	1	1	1	\$	45,000
8	B	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$17,000		B	1	1	1	1	\$	48,000
8	C	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$17,000		C	1	1	1	1	\$	45,000
8	D	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$17,000		D	1	1	1	1	\$	48,000
9	A	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$16,000		A	1	1	1	1	\$	51,000
9	B	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$16,000		B	1	1	1	1	\$	54,000
9	C	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$16,000		C	1	1	1	1	\$	51,000
9	D	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$16,000		D	1	1	1	1	\$	54,000
10	A	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$15,000		A	1	1	1	1	\$	57,000
10	B	##	1	\$2,000	3	(\$3,000)	\$0	(\$1,000)	\$15,000		B	1	1	1	1	\$	60,000

**Notes:**

- Can only move adjacently and diagonally
- Hint: Calculate cost of NOT peering vs. Cost of peering
- At end of game we assume all roll a 3 for remaining rolls
- Winner is the ISP will the largest bank account at the end

**Calculate**